

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 470481 (M.D.Fla.), 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 523
(Cite as: 2007 WL 470481 (M.D.Fla.))

C

United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division.
ELECTROSTIM MEDICAL SERVICES INC., a
Florida corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a for-
eign corporation, and AETNA Health, Inc., a Flor-
ida corporation, Defendants.
No. 8:06-cv-14-T-24TBM.

Feb. 13, 2007.

Charles Allen Carlson, Barnett Bolt Kirkwood
Long & McBride, Douglas Scott Gregory, Douglas
S. Gregory, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff.

Shari Gerson, Law Offices of Steven Ziegler, P.A.,
Hollywood, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, United States District
Judge.

*1 This cause comes before the Court on a Motion
to Dismiss Counts VII and XI of the Second
Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Aetna
Life Insurance Company and Aetna Health Inc.
(Doc. No. 31.) Plaintiff Electrostim Medical Ser-
vices, Inc. opposes this motion. (Doc. Nos.32, 36.)

I. Background

On September 5, 2006, Plaintiff filed its Second
Amended Complaint, alleging eleven causes of ac-
tion for contractual and equitable relief pursuant to
state law and the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA). (Doc. No. 28.) Plaintiff alleges
the following: Plaintiff supplies non-invasive med-
ical products to patients for use in pain control and
physical rehabilitation. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff's

products consist mainly of electrical stimulation de-
vices, such as “Tens Stimulators,” that help patients
manage and control pain and rehabilitate injuries. (*Id.*) Plaintiff supplies its products to physicians for
distribution directly to the patient. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Once
Plaintiff receives the physician's prescription and
the product is delivered to the patient, Plaintiff sub-
mits a claim for payment directly to the patient's in-
surance carrier. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff provided various products to patients in-
sured by Defendants and timely submitted claims
for payment to Defendants. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Defendants
failed to process the claims as is required by the pa-
tients' health plans, ERISA, and Florida Statutes §§
627.6131 and 641.3155. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The total value
of the claims submitted by Plaintiff that Defendants
have failed to pay exceeds \$1,000,000. (*Id.* at 9.)

In Count VII of its Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions constitute
unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of
Florida Statute §§ 641.3901 and 641.3903. (*Id.* at ¶
47-49.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misrepres-
ented the benefits, conditions, or terms of its con-
tracts, misrepresented the availability of a service,
knowingly delivered to Plaintiff false material
statements regarding payment for covered expenses
and authorizations for treatment, engaged in unfair
claim settlement practices, and failed to maintain
proper complaint handling procedures. (*Id.* at ¶ 48.)

On September 20, 2006, Defendants filed the in-
stant Motion to Dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, arguing that Count VII fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because § 641.3156 of the Health Maintenance Or-
ganization Act does not provide a private cause of
action for violations of Florida Statute §§ 641.3901
and 641.3903. (Doc. No. 31.) Defendants also
moved to dismiss Count XI, but Plaintiff has since
voluntarily dismissed that count from its Second
Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 33.) Accordingly,
the only issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff's

statutory claim of unfair or deceptive trade practices in Count VII must be dismissed.

II. Standard of Review

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court “must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” *Murphy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.*, 208 F.3d 959, 962 (11th Cir.2000). “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” *Id.* at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103. All that is required is “a short and plain statement of the claim.” *Fed.R.Civ.P.* 8(a)(2). The standard on a 12(b)(6) motion is not whether the plaintiff may ultimately prevail on its theory, “but whether the allegations are sufficient to allow [the plaintiff] to conduct discovery in an attempt to prove [its] allegations.” *Jackam v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. Mideast, Ltd.*, 800 F.2d 1577, 1579-80 (11th Cir.1986).

II. Discussion

*2 Defendants argue that Count VII of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 641.3901 and 641.3903 should be dismissed because § 641.3156 of the Health Maintenance Organization Act does not permit a medical provider, such as Plaintiff, to bring a private cause of action to enforce those statutes. Instead, Defendants argue, the Florida Department of Insurance has the sole authority to enforce the Act by bringing suits against health maintenance organizations.

In response, Plaintiff argues that its right to sue is derived from its role as a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between Defendants and their insured.

Plaintiff asserts that it is a third-party beneficiary of the contracts because it provided medical supplies to the insured on behalf of Defendants in anticipation that Defendants would compensate Plaintiff for those supplies. Plaintiffs allege that those contracts incorporate relevant provisions of the Health Maintenance Organization Act, including §§ 641.3901 and 641.3903 that prohibit unfair or deceptive trade practices, and that it can pursue its claim under those statutes as an issue arising out of the contracts.

The Health Maintenance Organization Act “primarily seeks to regulate the business of health maintenance organizations in [Florida], to ensure that they provide at least acceptable quality health care to their insureds (or subscribers as defined by the statute).” *Fla. Physicians Union, Inc. v. United Health Care of Fla., Inc.*, 837 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003). In particular, §§ 641.3903 and 641.3903 prohibit health maintenance organizations from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... [including] misrepresent[ing] benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any health maintenance contract.” Pursuant to the Act, the Florida Department of Insurance has the power to determine whether any health maintenance organization is engaged in any unfair or deceptive act or practice. *Fla. Stat.* § 641.3905; *Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc.*, 778 So.2d 1037, 1040 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001).

“The HMO Act does not expressly authorize a private cause of action to enforce its provisions.” *Foundation Health v. Westside EKG Assocs.*, 944 So.2d 188, ---, 2006 WL 2971764, at *3 (Fla.2006). “However, ... this does not ‘preclude the right to bring a common law ... claim based upon the same allegations.’ “ *Id.* (quoting *Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan*, 843 So.2d 842, 852 (Fla.2003)). For example, in *Foundation Health*, 944 So.2d at *4-5, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the statutory provisions of the Act regarding prompt payments could be incorporated into contracts between the health maintenance organization and the sub-

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scriber, such that providers, like Plaintiff, may sue for breach of contract. Significantly, the court ruled that an allegation that the health maintenance organization violated the statutory provisions regarding prompt payments “is not sufficient by itself to establish a private cause of action.” *Id.* at *4. “Instead, a party must bring a recognized common law cause of action,” such as a common law cause of action for breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. *Id.*

*3 Here, Count VII of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is not a common law cause of action for breach of contract. Rather, it is a statutory cause of action for relief from violations of §§ 641.3901 and 641.3903. Those statutory provisions may be incorporated into the contracts between Defendants and their insured such that Plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. *See id.* In fact, Plaintiff appears to have alleged such a claim in Count V. However, Plaintiff cannot bring a private cause of action for violation for unfair or deceptive trade practices under §§ 641.3901 and 641.3903. *See id.* Therefore, the Court concludes that Count VII must be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

It is **ORDERED AND ADJUDGED** that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 31) is **GRANTED** as to Count VII and **DENIED AS MOOT** as to Count XI.

DONE AND ORDERED.

M.D.Fla.,2007.

Electrostim Medical Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

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